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Recent empirical research on the relationship between income inequality
and economic growth has provided controversial results. Some studies
predict a negative, and some a positive effect of inequality on growth.
Answers to the controversy have usually been sought from problems in the
estimation technique, the measure of inequality, or from some form of
non-linearity between inequality and growth. This study shows that the
controversy can be attributed to all three aforementioned causes.  In
conclusion, this study finds that the effect of inequality to growth depends
on the level of economic development – as Kuznets originally argued.
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21 Introduction
In classical economic theory, inequality of incomes was thought to influence
economic growth rates through savings and consumption. According to Adam Smith
(1811), an increased division of labor raises productivity, but savings govern capital
accumulation, which enables production growth. It was a common belief in the 18th
century that only rich people saved. Therefore, economic growth was possible only
when there were enough rich people in society. Adam Smith also argued that
production growth would not be possible without sufficient demand. He stated that
every man should be able to provide for himself and his family. This would constitute
the threshold of sustainable inequality and would assure a sufficient level of demand.
According to John Maynard Keynes (1936), inequality of incomes leads to slower
economic growth. Keynes argued that marginal consumption rates are fairly equal
among all income brackets. As a result, aggregate consumption depends on changes
in aggregate income. According to Keynes, demand is the basis of investments, and
because inequality lowers aggregate consumption, inequality of incomes will
diminish economic growth.
Inequality of incomes may also affect economic growth rates more indirectly. In
sociology, inequality of incomes has been found to cause social disorganization,
which is commonly associated with increased crime rates and lower social capital
(Shaw & McKay 1969, Sampson & Groves 1989, Sampson & Raudenbush 1999).
Inequality can also increase corruption and illegal rent-seeking (Jong-Sun & Khagram
2005, Merton 1938). Property crimes, vandalism, theft and corruption in particular
can harm economic growth by discouraging investments and lowering productivity by
inflicting additional costs on companies (Hall & Jones 1999, Murphy etc. 1993).
Social  capital  is  also  considered  to  consist  of  such  societal  features  as  trust,  norms
and social networks, which can be considered to be important factors behind
economic growth (Putnam 1993, Whiteley 2000). Other factors through which
inequality has been linked to growth include human capital, division of labor, and
taxation (Barro 2000, Fishman & Simhon 2002, Forbes 2000).
The effects of income inequality on economic development may also be non-linear.
Developing economies need assets in order to raise their economy to a higher growth
path. Inequality of incomes may enable greater investments through greater aggregate
savings. A greater amount of capital in developed economies may require a higher
level of consumption. Equality of incomes will raise aggregate consumption if
marginal consumption rates are fairly equal among income brackets, or if the poor
have greater marginal consumption rates than the rich. Given credit-market
imperfections inequality may discourage schooling in rich economies, and encourage
it in poor economies (Fishman & Simhon 2002). Inequality can also increase social
disorganization more easily in rich than in poor economies (Merton 1938, Shaw &
McKay 1969).
The macroeconomic effects of inequality have been under investigation for several
decades, but no clear consensus on the direction of the effect has emerged. Empirical
research on the subject truly commenced in 1955 when Simon Kuznets released his
study. According to Kuznet's relation, inequality of incomes will first increase and
3then decrease in the course of economic development. Inequality will increase in the
beginning of industrialization due to a growing wage disparity between agricultural
and factory pay. Lower mortality rates, greater fertility rates, and investments in new
technology will also increase the inequality of incomes during the first phases of
industrialization. Growth of inequality is necessary because an egalitarian agrarian
economy cannot accumulate enough savings so that capital creation would be
sufficient  for  production  growth.  Later  on,  as  the  economy  industrializes,  the
distribution of incomes will even out as a larger portion of people move to higher
industry pay. Kuznet’s data, composed of data from three countries, the United States,
Germany and Great Britain, did give some proof for the existence of such a relation,
but subsequent research has produced mixed results.1
Recent studies have encountered problems concerning the measure of income
distribution and model estimation. Many previous studies have, for example, relied on
a simple cross-country estimation. This has an obvious drawback, e.g., the omitted-
variables bias. If region-, country-, or some group-specific factors affect growth rates,
explanatory variables can capture the effects of these factors, and parameter estimates
will not represent the true effect of the explanatory variables per se.2 Studies using
panel estimation to control for the omitted-variable bias have commonly used Klaus
Deininger and Lyn Squire’s (1996) Gini index as an estimate of income distribution.3
Anthony Atkinson and Andrea Brandolini (2001) and James Galbraith and Hyunsub
Kum (2004) have raised concerns about the consistency of Deininger and Squire’s
dataset. Kristin Forbes (2000, p. 882-4) has also conducted a sensitivity analysis
according to which the growth elasticity of inequality does not vary between different
income groups within countries. Forbes uses fixed effects to estimate an equation that
includes a lagged dependent variable, which leads to inconsistent parameter
estimates. Forbes uses fixed effects because she estimates the elasticity of growth
with respect to inequality separately in different income groups, which in turn leads to
a very small number of observations in certain groups.4 This is an obvious problem
facing the study of non-linear relations with endogenous explanatory variables in a
panel setting. That is, there are usually not enough observations in different groups
for feasible group- or country-specific instrumental estimation.5 The problem can be
approached with non-linear estimators that enable the use of full data coverage in a
country- or group-specific estimation.
This study uses an improved measure of income distribution and a non-linear
estimator to tackle the problems presented above. The results imply that inequality
has no statistically significant linear effect on growth, but the elasticity of growth
with respect to inequality changes with the level of economic development. More
1 For example, Barro (2000) and Lundberg and Squire (2003) versus Forbes (2000) and Deininger and
Squire (1998).
2 There are, for example, clear indications of this in Deininger and Squire’s (1998, p. 270) study, where
country dummies affected the growth elasticity of inequality. More detailed analysis of problems
relating to the omitted-variable bias in growth regressions with inequality as an explanatory variable
can be found in Forbes (2000).
3 For example Barro (2000), Forbes (2000) and Banerjee and Duflo (2003).
4 Forbes (2000, 883) estimates the elasticity of growth with respect to inequality in countries below
$1000, above $1000, below $3000, above $3000, below $6000 and above $6000. Elasticity of growth
with respect to inequality is positive in all groups.
5 For example, Forbes’s (2000, p. 883) smallest groups have only 48 and 54 observations.
4specifically income inequality accelerates growth in poor economies and decelerates
growth in rich economies.
2 Theoretical effects of inequality on growth
2.1 Credit-market imperfections
Credit-market imperfections refer to the situation in which people's access to credit is
restricted. These restrictions can originate from the regulations of legislative
institutions' or credit rationing imposed by central banks. Further, credit-market
imperfections are present when acquiring credit in return for expected future profits is
gravely limited.
If credit-market imperfections are present, the income distribution can affect the
economy through changes in human capital or in the division of labor and
employment. Given credit-market imperfections, inequality of incomes will restrict
households’ opportunities for education.6 If an economy’s aggregate capital is small,
unevenly distributed incomes urge capital owners to invest in specialization (Fishman
& Simhon 2002). In this case, inequality results in a higher level of human capital, a
higher division of labor and faster economic growth (Fishman & Simhon 2002).
When an economy’s aggregate capital is large, the more equal distribution of income
encourages households to invest in specialization and entrepreneurship (Fishman &
Simhon 2002). Equality of incomes will create a more risk-free environment and a
wide-based demand for goods. This will lead to higher employment, a greater
division of labor, and faster economic growth.
2.2 Political economy
In a society in which the mean income exceeds the median income, the idea may
occur to even out the distribution of income through the political process (Barro
2000). In such cases, taxation and transfer payments are commonly used to
redistribute income, regardless of their unclear overall effect on economic activity
and income distribution. Tightened income taxation affects consumption rates by
lowering the disposable incomes of the rich, but income transfers to lower income
brackets increase their disposable incomes. How this affects the aggregate
consumption depends on the effectiveness of the tools used to redistribute incomes,
and on the marginal consumption rates in different income groups. Capital taxation
lowers the motivation to invest. A decline in investments lowers the GDP growth rate
and job creation, thus affecting the distribution of incomes. Wage taxation has a two-
fold effect on the supply of labor. At higher wage levels, the supply of labor is usually
assumed to be backward bending because the marginal benefit of working more
becomes smaller than the marginal cost of losing more leisure. Wage taxation shifts
the point of juncture upwards in the labor supply curve, increasing the supply of labor
and/or  the  work  effort.  At  the  lowest  wage  levels,  income  transfers  may  lower  the
supply of labor and/or the work effort if the difference in after-tax incomes between
employment and unemployment is not great enough.
6 To be more precise, when access to credit is limited, households’ investment opportunities depend on
their assets and incomes. Thus, given credit-market imperfections, poor households usually forego
investments in human capital (Barro 2000).
5The  redistribution  of  income  through  a  political  process  is  only  possible  when
political power is distributed evenly, e.g., every consenting adult has only one vote
(Barro 2000). If this is not the case, the distribution of votes defines the distribution
of power and income. When incomes are distributed unevenly, the wealthier portion
of  the  population  may  try  to  influence  politicians  not  to  increase  taxes  and  income
transfers, which can lead to a corrupt government (Barro 2000). In a country with a
great inequality of incomes, the poor are also usually more dependent on social
services. The poor may then be forced to use corruption to ensure those much needed
social services (Jong-sung & Khagram 2005). If corruption spreads through the public
administration, it can lead to inefficiencies in the distribution of licences, social
benefits etc. The demand for licenses is usually high and inflexible, so a rise in
license prices lowers the profits of producers and investors (Murphy et al. 1993).
Inefficiencies in the distribution of social benefits, basic health care etc. may lower
the disposable incomes of both the rich and the poor, therefore lowering the rates of
aggregate consumption.
2.3 Unrest related to social policy
A rising inequality of incomes may motivate individuals to perpetrate crimes, illegal
rent-seeking activities or other acts that disturb the stability of society (Barro 2000,
Merton 1938, Shaw & McKay 1969). Disorderly conduct may grow if people do not
feel reasonably equal in the satisfaction of their basic needs (Merton 1938). Basic
health care, education and some form of social security can be seen as basic needs.
Inequality can also increase social disorganization, when social networks are
disrupted in residential areas (Shaw & McKay 1969). Social disorganization may
lower social capital and increase crime and delinquency rates (Shaw & McKay 1969,
Sampson & Groves 1989). Crime and illegal rent-seeking activities may inflict
additional costs on producers and investors (Hall & Jones 1999, Murphy et al. 1993).
Lower  social  capital  can  also  increase  the  bargaining  and  enforcement  costs  of
contracts as the parties have less trust in each other (Ostrom 1990). Low social capital
also usually means a more risk-averse society.
Notably, growing inequality can also increase social disorganization and crime more
easily in rich than in poor countries (Merton 1938, Shaw & McKay 1969). The
culture in poor countries is usually community and family oriented, while the culture
in rich countries tends to be more money- and individual-oriented (Merton 1938,
Shaw & McKay 1969). In cultures where money and individualism are highlighted,
individuals usually react more easily to inequality of incomes with disorderly conduct
(Merton 1938, Shaw & McKay 1969).
2.4 Saving rates
In neo-classical growth theory, aggregate saving is central to production growth
(Mankiw et al. 1992, Solow 1956). In Solow’s (1956) growth model, an economy’s
production level is determined by
),( ALKFY = , (2.1)
6where Y is output, K is physical capital, A is technical development, and L is labor.
Savings govern capital accumulation, and capital stock evolves through time
according to
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where k  is capital per laborer, k&  is a change of capital relative to labor and technical
development, d  is the depreciation of capital relative to labor, s  is savings relative to
labor, n  is the growth rate of labor, and g  is the growth of productivity relative to
labor (appendix 1). The economy’s steady-state growth rate is
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(appendix 1). If technical development ( A ) is constant, the economy grows if
s > )( dng ++  and declines if s < )( dng ++ .
High saving rates are thought to be especially important for developing economies,
because raising an economy to a higher growth path requires substantial investments
(Sachs et al. 2004, Stiglitz 2002). Funds for investments come from aggregate savings
and/or loans from abroad. Domestic investments can also be replaced by direct
foreign investments. These options are not equal in risk. Large scale lending can lead
to a balance of payments deficit and to a debt circle if the higher growth path remains
unattained. Direct foreign investments do create jobs and raise incomes in the region,
but they also supersede the domestic supply. A major portion of the profits of foreign
firms are also usually repatriated to a foreign country. This affects the balance of
payments and hinders the exercise of an independent monetary policy. Foreign
investments are also usually highly sensitive to economic fluctuations and
speculation, which may cause uncontrollable shifts in the balance of capital. Thus,
increasing the domestic saving rate is usually the safest way for a developing country
to finance its structural investments.
Consequently, inequality of incomes can accelerate economic growth in developing
economies by raising aggregate savings, but production growth is still not possible
without sufficient demand. If the incomes of a major portion of the population do not
grow sufficiently in the course of economic development, the higher growth path may
remain unattained.
3 Model and data
The basis for estimation is a commonly used extended version of the neo-classical
growth model:
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7where itk  is the residual, which includes both the possible country-specific effect ( iu )
and the error term )( ite .
The data consists of the following variables: real GDP per capita, change of real GDP
per capita, gross domestic investments as a portion of the GDP, gross enrollment in
secondary school as a portion of the population of the age group that officially
corresponds to that education level, and the Gini index. The data covers the years
1970 - 95, and it is mostly compiled from the Global Development Network’s Growth
Database (Easterly & Sewadeh 2002). The only exception is the Gini index, which is
acquired from the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) (Galbraith & Kum
2004). Descriptive statistics are presented in table 1 and the country list in appendix
3.
Gross domestic product is stated in real terms with the base year 1985. The GDP
growth rate is measured as a ratio between the real GDP growth rate and the
population  growth  rate.  Secondary  school  enrollment  constitutes  the  education  that
completes the basic education and aims toward lifelong learning and human
development. (Easterly & Sewadeh 2002)
Income distribution is estimated with the University of Texas Inequality Project’s
EHII2.1 Gini index. EHII2.1 combines Deininger and Squire’s (1996) Gini index
with a set of measures of the dispersion of pay across industrial categories in the
manufacturing sector and the manufacturing share of the population . Although pay
inequality and income inequality are technically different economic concepts, they
are closely related. In most countries the manufacturing pay is a major portion of all
pay, and pay is usually the single largest portion of income everywhere. The
manufacturing sector is also a foundational part of the economy, and the low-wage
workers in the manufacturing sector are substitutes for the low-wage workers in the
service and agriculture sectors. (Galbraith & Kum 2004, p. 9-17)
EHII2.1 Gini index is obtained by regressing Deininger and Squire’s Gini coefficients
on the values of explanatory variables, which include the different income measures
of Deininger and Squire’s data set, the set of measures of the dispersion of pay in the
manufacturing sector, and the manufacturing share of the population. All estimates
are adjusted to household gross-income. Unexplained variations in Deininger and
Squire’s income measures are treated as inexplicable, and they are disregarded in the
calculations of EHII2.1 Gini coefficients. (Galbraith & Kum 2004, 17)
variable                        mean          std. deviation   min.  max.
GDP 5353.09 5202.27 341.00 38562.43
GDP growth rate (%)  2.4783 3.9595           -14.4909 20.9099
domestic investments (%)     22.1770 7.2295   4.5308 46.3420
Gini index                        37.6475 4.7251            26.6300 48.5000
sec. school enrol. (%)            70.5245          27.6981   7.0000          142.0000
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
8The EHII2.1 Gini index is distributed more evenly than Deininger and Squire´s
(1996) Gini index. The steep declines and elevations in the values of Gini, which are
common in Deininger and Squire’s dataset, are not present in EHII2.1.7 The main
reason behind the variation is the different income measures (net-gross, household-
per capita, expenditure-income) of Deininger and Squire's dataset, which are not
always compatible. This is clearly seen from the great differences in Gini values
depending on the measure used (Galbraith & Kum 2004, p. 4-9).8 Deininger and
Squire suggest adding 6.6 Gini points to the expenditure data to make their dataset
more compatible. It is quite unlikely, however, that this simple mathematical
procedure would erase the heterogeneity of the data, especially as there are great
differences in the values of other measures of Gini (Atkinson & Brandolini 2001,
Galbraith & Kum 2004, Knowles 2005).9 Values of EHII2.1 also correspond to the
estimates of income distributions of other research institutes, such as VATT and the
OECD,10 better  than  those  of  Deininger  and  Squire’s Gini  index  (Föster  & Pearson
2002, Galbraith & Kum 2004).
Figure 1 depicts the correlation pattern between the logarithmic EHII2.1 Gini index
and the logarithmic growth rate of real GDP. The variance is quite stable and not
much can be deduced from it. However, the scattergram does not tell anything about
the relationship between the Gini index and GDP growth in a single country or a
group of countries.
Figure 1. EHII2.1 Gini index and GDP growth rate
7 In Deininger and Squire’s (1996) dataset, for example, Brazil’s Gini index is saw edged, fluctuating
constantly between values of about 55 and about 60 in the period 1970-90. Columbia experiences a
drop of about 7 points in values of Gini in 1973-74 and an elevation of about 8 points in 1974-77.
8 The lowest mean Gini value of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, is 43.86 (per capita net
expenditure), and the highest 57.82 (household net income) (Galbraith & Kum 2004, p. 5).
9 For example, the mean Gini value of South Asia is 39.73 according to household gross income, 31.55
according to household net expenditure, 30.06 according to per capita net income, and 32.44 according
to per capita net expenditure (Galbraith & Kum 2004, p. 5).
10 VATT (Government Institute for Economic Research) is a research centre in Finland.
94 Estimation
Error terms in equation (3.1) are assumed to be independent and identically
distributed ( ite ~ ),.(..
2sodii ). Growth is measured in five-year averages to control for
short-run economic fluctuations. The average growth rate during each five-year
period is regressed on the values of the explanatory variables in the year immediately
preceding each period.11 The use of five-year intervals means that there are only five
observations available from each country. The instrumentation of endogenous
variables will drop the number of observations in the estimation to three for each
country. So, in practice, the estimation covers the years 1980 to 1995.
As shown by Forbes (2000, p. 876), the estimation of equation (3.1) is complicated by
the endogeneity of the GDP, which can be demonstrated by writing GDP growth as a
difference in levels of income and adding 1, -tiincome  to both sides:
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where 11 += bg . Clearly 0)( 1, ¹-tiit incomeE k . In panel data all explanatory
variables can correlate with the (possible) country-specific effect, and the
endogeneity of every explanatory variable must be tested. This is done using
Hausman’s (1978) specification test (appendix 2).
Because the model (3.1) is dynamic by nature, the estimation is done with the
generalized method of moments estimator (GMM). The benefits of GMM include that
heteroskedasticity does not affect it, and it can easily be equipped to withstand
autocorrelation. The first and second lags of the differences of each explanatory
variable are used as instruments for the explanatory variable presumed to be
endogenous.12 In Hausman’s (1978) specification test, the GDP is treated as
endogenous in the reference estimator, and in the estimator presumed to be consistent
under misspecification, the GDP and the explanatory variable to be tested are treated
as endogenous.
EHII2.1 Gini’s and investments’ endogenous estimators have smaller error variances
than their exogenous counterparts. Consequently, it is clear that both Gini and
domestic investment are endogenous. Hausman’s test statistic for secondary school
enrollment is negative. Because the test statistic should follow 2c -distribution with
three degrees of freedom, nothing can be deduced from a negative test statistic.
However, it is obvious that the endogeneity of Gini and domestic investments causes
the reference estimator to be inconsistent under 0H  (appendix 2). Consistency is
achieved when domestic investments and Gini are also treated as endogenous in the
reference estimator. Despite the correction, the test statistic of secondary schooling
remains negative.
11 For example, the averaged growth rate in 1986 to 1990 is regressed on the values of the explanatory
variables in 1985.
12 The correlation between difference and level commonly diminishes rapidly after the second lag.
Thus, only the first two lags of differences are usually relevant for the identification.
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In technical terms the only reason for the negative test statistic is that the difference
between covariance matrices of the reference estimator and the estimator presumed to
be consistent under misspecification is indefinite (appendix 2). There are four
parameters included in the estimation (excluding intercept) and only 121 observations
available. Because GMM is efficient only asymptotically, the number of observations
may be too small for this to be attained. Hausman’s (1978, p. 1252) specification test
presupposes that the efficient estimator attains the asymptotic Cramer-Rao bound. In
small or in mid-sized samples with badly behaving distributions, the GMM estimator
does not necessarily attain that limit (Altonji & Segal 1996, Carrasco & Florens
2004). If the reference estimator is not asymptotically fully efficient, the rationale
behind Hausman’s specification test is no longer valid and the test statistic may be
biased (appendix 2). Moreover, the assumptions behind Hausman’s specification test
are highly asymptotic, and the definiteness of the estimated covariance matrix of the
difference between the two estimators can never be guaranteed with finite datasets
(Rahiala 2006).
Returning to the issue at hand, when secondary schooling is treated as endogenous,
there are significant changes in the parameter estimates of all the explanatory
variables. Thus, secondary schooling seems very likely to be endogenous.
The results of the nonlinear GMM estimation of equation (3.1) are presented in table
2. A Newey-West estimator with lag one is used as the GMM estimator’s weight
matrix to account for autocorrelation in the variables appearing in the orthogonality
conditions. Hansen’s test is used to evaluate the validity of extra instruments.
According to the test, the orthogonality conditions seem quite realistic for the chosen
set of instruments.
According to the results, the elasticity of growth with respect to domestic investments
was approximately 0.04. The standard deviation of the estimator was about 0.017.
The parameter estimates of the GDP, Gini and secondary schooling were not
statistically significant.
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In  order  to  study  the  elasticities  of  economic  growth  with  respect  to  domestic
investments, to the GDP level, and to the Gini index separately in countries with
different levels of economic development, equation (3.1) is transformed to:
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where idr  is a dummy variable for rich economies, idmi  is a dummy variable for
middle-income economies, idp  is a dummy variable for poor economies, and itk  is
the residual, which includes both the possible country-specific effect ( iu ) and the
error term )( ite ,  ( ite ~ ),.(..
2sodii ). Education is discarded from the equation (4.2),
because it had no statistically significant linear effect on growth, and as it was
assumed to have only a linear relationship on growth.13 A country is denoted as poor
if its GDP per capita was under $2000 in the year 1970, and rich if its GDP per capita
was over $7000 in 1970. Countries between these thresholds are denoted as middle
13 Leaving secondary school enrollment aside releases more degrees of freedom, and increases the
number of observations on poor countries. Leaving it aside from the estimation of equation (3.1) also
changes the parameter estimates of remaining variables only marginally.
growth5y
intercept -0.08105
 (0.0806)
GDP 1-t  0.00239
          (0.0021)
investments 1-t  0.03592
 (0.0167)*
Gini 1-t  0.01494
 (0.0173)
education 1-t  0.00268
 (0.0058)
Table 2. Results of the nonlinear GMM
estimation of growth
Hansen  3.87 (8)
countries     53
observations    121
* =p<0.05, ** =p<0.01. The parameter estimate’s
standard error is presented in parentheses. The first
and second lags of differences are used as
instruments for variables presumed to be
endogenous.
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income.14 Descriptive statistics assorted by income groups are presented in appendix
4.
The results of the non-linear Newey-West GMM estimation of equation (4.2) are
presented in table 3. As before, Newey-West uses one lag. All the explanatory
variables are assumed to be endogenous. The first and second lags of the differences
are used as their instruments. According to the Hansen’s test, orthogonality
conditions seem fairly realistic for the chosen set of instruments.
14 There are 24 poor, 12 rich and 17 middle-income countries in the dataset.
growth 5y
dummy-poor (dp) -0.10693*
(0.0413)
dummy-middle-income (dmi)  0.02518
 (0.0660)
dummy-rich (dr)  0.20178*
 (0.0783)
dp*GDP 1-t -0.00164
 (0.0017)
dmi*GDP 1-t  0.00034
 (0.0023)
dr*GDP 1-t -0.00412
 (0.0024)
dp*investment 1-t  0.04168***
 (0.0112)
dmi*investment 1-t  0.0137
 (0.0127)
dr*investment 1-t -0.05479
 (0.0302)
dp*Gini 1-t  0.03016**
 (0.0104)
dmi*Gini 1-t -0.00805
 (0.0129)
dr*Gini 1-t -0.04323
 (0.0163)**
Hansen   8.69 (18)
countries       53
observations      131
* =p<0.05, ** =p<0.01, *** =p<0.001. The parameter
estimates’ standard error is presented in parentheses. The
first and second lags of differences are used as instruments
for variables presumed to be endogenous.
Table 3. Growth elasticities of selected explanatory
variables in different income groups
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According to the results, the elasticity of growth in terms of rich economies was
approximately 0.20. The standard deviation of the estimator was about 0.73. The
elasticity of growth in terms of poor economies was approximately -0.11. The
standard deviation of the estimator was about 0.04. Dummy of the middle-income
economies was not statistically significant. Thus, income group-specific factors had a
clear effect on the growth rates. This implies that a normal cross-country analysis
could suffer from omitted-variables bias.
According to the results, coefficients of the GDP level were not statistically
significant. The elasticity of growth with respect to domestic investments was
approximately 0.04 in poor economies. The standard deviation of the estimator was
approximately 0.011. In rich and middle-income economies the coefficient of
domestic investments was not statistically significant.
The elasticity of growth with respect to Gini was approximately 0.03 in poor
economies. The standard deviation of the estimator was about 0.01. The elasticity of
growth with respect to Gini was approximately -0.04 in rich economies. The standard
deviation of the estimator was about 0.016. In middle-income economies, the
coefficient of the Gini was negative, but not statistically significant.
Accordingly, inequality had a clear positive effect on growth in developing
economies. If Keynes’s (1936) assumption about the steady marginal consumption
rates between income groups is sound, increasing inequality will increase savings and
lessening inequality will increase consumption. Dynan et al. (2004) have also
reported higher saving rates among the rich than the poor. In this case, the growth in
inequality of incomes would increase savings proportionally more than the amount of
concentration of incomes and vice versa. In poor economies, the elasticity of growth
with respect to domestic investments and Gini were very close in magnitude.
Therefore growth in aggregate savings was most likely one important factor affecting
the growth rate in poor economies.
Domestic investments had no effect on the growth rate in middle-income and rich
economies. This implies that when countries get richer they receive relatively more
foreign investments, whose influence on economic growth increases. In this case,
economic growth is less dependent on domestic investments and domestic savings.
Developed economies´ higher level of capital also requires higher consumption
levels.  A  large  part  of  the  GDP  of  developed  economies  comes  from  the  service
sector, and because exporting services is still highly restricted, domestic demand has
a larger effect on growth. As aggregate capital grows, aggregate consumption can be
raised by a more equal distribution of incomes, especially if savings rates are lower
among the poor. Increasing social disorganization may also have contributed to the
negative effect of inequality on growth in developed economies by lowering
productivity and social capital.
5 Conclusions
The results imply that inequality’s different impacts on growth rates in developing
and developed economies could result in different weightings of savings and
14
consumption in different stages of economic development. Both inequality and
domestic investments had a clear positive effect on the growth rates in developing
economies. Thus, domestic savings seem to play a clear role in the economic
development of poor economies. One reason for this could be that large-scale
overseas borrowing can result in problems in installment of loans. Therefore, the most
risk-neutral option for a developing country is to finance domestic investments
independently. Because capital is scarce, the growth of aggregate savings requires
that exiguous assets are centralized.
In developed economies the abundance of capital requires a higher level of aggregate
consumption than in developing economies. The results showed that domestic
investments had no effect on the growth rates in more developed economies. The
results also show that in rich economies the effect of inequality of incomes on growth
rates was negative. A large service sector and the limited mobility of services across
national borders enhance the effect of domestic consumption on growth in developed
economies. Equality of incomes raises consumption if marginal saving rates are equal
among income brackets or if the poor have lower saving rates than the rich and the
measures used to redistribute incomes are efficient. Inequality can also have a
stronger negative indirect effect on growth in developed economies, due to a more
money- and individual-oriented culture. If money is highlighted as a norm of success,
increasing inequality may increase crime and diminish social capital more easily than
in societies with more community-oriented cultures.
The results may have been influenced by the endogeneity of explanatory variables,
sample selection bias, and measurement error. Exogeneity assumptions were tested
only for country-specific effect. Interactions between income inequality and growth
rate may extend beyond several years, and because only the first and second lags of
the difference were used as instruments for Gini index, there are no guarantees that
the possible time-dependency has been cancelled. At its best, the data included only
about  one-fourth  of  all  the  countries  in  the  world.  For  example,  the  data  did  not
include any of the former socialistic countries that converted to market economies at
beginning of the 1990s. Therefore, systematic errors may have influenced the results.
The Gini index is also not unflawed as an estimate of income distribution because it is
only a representation of statistical summaries. Thus, the level of inequality given by
EHII2.1 Gini may not have represented the true level of inequality in the countries in
question.
Owing to the inevitable restrictions, the results suggest that further research is needed.
As the results are congruent with the theory and if some form of inverted relation is
proven to exist, a major source of ambiguity in the field of study may be able to be
cancelled. Previous studies have suffered from inconsistent measures of income
distribution, but the examination of the inverted relation has also been complicated by
statistical obscurities. The use of country-related constants in estimation is
statistically dubious, and estimators’ asymptotic properties suffer greatly if several
parameters are estimated with a few dozen observations. However, with non-linear
estimators the vagueness relating to the use of country constants can be bypassed in a
statistically meaningful way.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Solow’s neo-classical growth model
In Solow’s (1956) growth model an economy’s production level originates from
),( ALKFY = , (1)
where Y is output, K is physical capital, A is technical development and L is labor.
Technical development is assumed to be Harrod -neutral type:
gteAtA )0()( = .
Taking logarithms and differentiating )(tA  against time gives us:
g
A
A
=
&
(2)
Labor is assumed to be a constant fraction of the population and exogenous
nteLtL 0)( = .
Taking logarithms from )(tL  and differentiating it against time gives:
n
L
L
=
&
(3)
Model assumes constant returns to scale on capital and effective labour. This allows
equation (1) to be written as
kkf
AL
KF
AL
Y
ººúû
ù
êë
é= )(1, (4)
The intensive form of production function, )(kf , is assumed to satisfy 0)0( =f ,
0)(' >kf  and 0)('' <kf , and Inada (1963) conditions: ¥=® )('lim kfok  and
0)('lim =¥® kfk .
Supply of capital is assumed to be inflexible, so capital depends only on savings ( s )
and depreciation ( d ):
dKysK -= )(& , (5)
where s  is marginal propensity to save and d  is the rate of capital depreciation.
Taking logarithms on (4) we get
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)(ln)(ln)(ln)(ln tLtAtKtk --= .
Differentiating this against time and combining it with equations (2) and (3) brings us
to
gn
K
dkYs
k
k
--
-
=
)(& , (6)
from which we get
kdgnsyk )( ++-=& . (7)
In the steady-state, an economy’s level of capital is
a-
*
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and the steady-state growth rate is
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Appendix 2: Hausman’s (1978) specification test
Let us study a linear model
vXXy ++= ab ~ , (1)
where y  represents the T -dimensional vector of observed values of the dependent
variable and v  stand for the corresponding vector of error terms ( 0ºEv ). The
explanatory variables X~  and the error vector v  are assumed to be mutually
uncorrelated ( 0'~ =vXE ), whereas v  and X  might be correlated ( 0' ¹vEX ). Denote
the number of these problematic explanatory variables by K  ( KÂÎb ). We further
assume that there exists an estimator 0ˆb  for b  that is T -consistent, asymptotically
normal and asymptotically most efficient under the hypothesis 0':0 =vEXH  (such
as the OLS-estimator), but inconsistent under the alternative 0':1 ¹vEXH . Let 1ˆb
be any T -consistent, asymptotically normal estimator for b  that is consistent even
under the alternative 1H . In this case, the difference 01 ˆˆˆ bb -=q  could be used to test
the hypothesis 0H  against 1H . (Hausman 1978, p.1252-53, Rahiala 2006)
In order to formulate a one-dimensional test statistic based on the difference qˆ , we
need to know the asymptotic covariance matrix of qˆ . Because the estimators 1ˆb  and
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0ˆb  used the same data they will be mutually correlated. For brevity, let us denote the
asymptotic covariance matrix under 0H  of )ˆ( bb -T  for any T -consistent
estimator bˆ  by )ˆ(cov(.)ˆ( bbb -= TAsyV  and further )ˆ( 11 bVV =  and )ˆ( 00 bVV =
(Hausman 1978, p. 1253, Rahiala 2006).
Proposition 1: Under 0H , 01)ˆcov(.)ˆ( VVqTAsyqV -== .
Proof: Let us assume that the proposition is not true and that )ˆ()()ˆ( 01 gVVV +¹ bb ,
because [ ] 0'ˆ)ˆ(lim)ˆ),ˆ(cov(. 00 ¹-×=-= ¥® qETqTTAsyC T bbbb . By studying
the properties of the estimators qrCr ˆ'ˆˆ 0
)( bb =  (where r  is  a  scalar)  we  would  note
that these new estimators would be T -consistent for b  under 0H  and )ˆ(
)(rV b
would be of the form
CqVCrCrCCrCVV r )ˆ(''')ˆ()ˆ( 20
)( +--= bb . (2)
The first derivative of the matrix-valued function
CqVCrCrCVVrF r )ˆ(''2)ˆ(ˆ()( 20
)( +-=-= bb (3)
with respect to r  would then be of the form
CqVrCCCrF )ˆ('2'2)(' +-= . (4)
Thus, 0'2)0(' £-= CCF  in the sense of being non-positive definite. But 0)0( =F ,
which means that there would exist some small positive values of r  that would
correspond to an asymptotically more efficient estimator )(ˆrb  than 0ˆb  under 0H .
Because this contradicts our basic assumption, we can conclude that C  must be equal
to a zero-matrix. (Hausman 1978, p. 1254, Rahiala 2006).
Corollary: 001 ³-VV  in the sense of being non-negative definite (Hausman 1978, p.
1254).
Proof: Because )ˆ(qV  is an asymptotic covariance matrix, it has to be non-negative
definite.
Hausman’s test statistic, based on above results, is of the form
[ ] )ˆˆ()ˆ()ˆ()'ˆˆ( 0110101 bbbbbb ---×= -VVTH  , (6)
which should be asymptotically 2Kc  -distributed under 0H , because both estimators
0ˆb  and 1ˆb  were assumed to be asymptotically normal.
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However, if 0ˆb  is not asymptotically fully efficient,
0)ˆ),ˆ(cov(. 0 ¹-= qTTAsyC bb ,and
')ˆ()ˆ()ˆˆ()ˆ( 001 CCqVVqVV --+=+= bbb , which would result in
')ˆ()ˆ()ˆ( 01 CCqVVV --=- bb . (7)
Thus the rationale behind the test statistics (6) would no longer be valid. If, moreover,
the estimators 0ˆb  and 1ˆb  would be highly correlated, there would be no guarantee of
the definiteness of the matrix )ˆ()ˆ( 01 bb VV - . Note also that the above results are
highly asymptotic, and with finite data sets, the definiteness of the estimated matrix
)ˆ()ˆ( 01 bb VV -  can never be guaranteed either (Rahiala 2006).
Appendix 3: Country list
AUSTRALIA
ALGERIA
BANGLADESH
BOLIVIA
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CANADA
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
CHILE
COLOMBIA
DENMARK
DOMINICAN
ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR
EGYPT
FIJI
GHANA
GREECE
GUATEMALA
HAITI
HONDURAS
ICELAND
INDIA
INDONESIA
ISRAEL
IRELAND
ITALY
JAMAICA
JAPAN
KENYA
KUWAIT
MADAGASCAR
MALAYSIA
MALTA
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MAURITIUS
MEXICO
MOROCCO
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND
NIGERIA
NORWAY
PAKISTAN
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PHILIPPINES
PORTUGAL
SINGAPORE
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
THAILAND
UNITED KINGD
UNITED STATES
VENEZUELA
ZIMBABWE
Appendix 4: Descriptive statistics
variable                        mean          std. deviation   min.  max.
GDP  5448.42 2945.54  2028.00         15838.30
GDP growth rate (%)  3.6159 3.3142            -5.0502 12.4545
domestic investments (%)     24.4290 7.0816  9.9300 46.3420
Gini index                        37.1244 3.5676            30.2700 47.3000
 Descriptive statistics: middle-income countries
variable                        mean          std. deviation   min.  max.
GDP 12573.25 4733.59  6055.00 38562.43
GDP growth rate (%)  2.3415 4.3286           -14.4909 20.4806
domestic investments (%)     22.6989 5.7152 10.2240 39.0160
Gini index                        33.7140 4.4289            27.7700 48.5000
 Descriptive statistics: rich countries
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variable                        mean          std. deviation   min.  max.
GDP  1458.46   705.11   341.00           4891.00
GDP growth rate (%)  1.7118 4.0736          -10.2099 20.9099
domestic investments (%)     20.3659 7.7628  4.5308 45.1300
Gini index                        41.0506 2.5870            33.5000 48.0400
 Descriptive statistics: poor countries
